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Central to most intellectual debates on political organization is the issue of human nature, for 
one’s understanding of it influences one’s prescriptions on how best society can be governed. 
This paper examines the contractarian theories of Hobbes and Locke in their attempts to 
identify the conditions for social order. Deploying a critical and comparative method, the 
paper identifies the failure of the two theories to recognize the complexity of human nature, a 
complexity which forecloses the plausibility of a descriptive straitjacket. The paper further 
argues that contrary to Hobbes’ pessimism and Locke’s optimism towards human nature, the 
individual has qualities which point to a delicate balance of both. Consequently, the paper 
highlights the imperatives of social order in a manner that accommodates the complexity of 
human nature. It concludes that it is on the basis of the appreciation of these dimensions of 
human nature that we can hope to evolve an enduring social order. 
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Introduction  
The issue of human nature poses a number of problems that cut across a wide range of 
disciplines. At the metaphysical level, there are those who hold that man has a dual nature. 
For instance , Russell’s reading of Plato  is that Plato was of the view that there is more to the 
material component of man, as the physical is only a reflection of the real, or the merely 
manifest part of a complex whole (Russell 1947, 241). On the other hand are those who see 
man as a bundle of material components with nothing beyond his appearance. Aristotle and 
Baron Holbach evidently belong to this strand of thought. For the latter especially, man is:    
... as a whole, the result of a certain combination of matter, endowed with 
particular properties, competent to give, capable of receiving, certain 
impulses, the arrangement of which is called organization, of which the 
essence is, to feel, to think, to act, to move, after a manner distinguished from 
other beings with which he can be compared. Man, therefore, ranks in an 
order, in a system, in a class by himself, which differs from that of other 
animals, in whom we do not perceive those properties of which he is 
possessed (Holbach 1770, 15). 
 
As LeBuffe (2002, 11) explains, Holbach's naturalism requires that human nature be 
understood in terms of laws, and that human action be comprehended in terms of universal 
determinism. Nevertheless, it allows that in many ways, human beings may differ in kind 
from other bodies, even animals, and it allows that human beings may have many properties, 
notably thought, that have traditionally been denied to matter. Similarly, in his dualism, 
Descartes (1984, 113) argues that the mind as opposed to the body is a separate entity, which 
performs functions that cannot be described as physical. 
 
A careful study of the positions above reveals that the dispute which has taken centre-stage at 
the level of metaphysics extends to the political realm. This is because our conception of 
what constitutes human nature and by extension the human person’s place and role in the 
society has serious implications for social ordering. Thus in the political realm we have the 
anarchists, who see man as a rational being whose nature is incompatible with the oppression 
that society has imposed on it under the guise of government. The human person is a free 
being capable of living peaceably with fellow human beings of equal natural disposition, 
wants and drives. Consequently, unfettered freedom is the best for his/her soul (Adams 1993, 
172). On the other hand, Karl Marx (1990, 13) has an economic view of human nature. For 
him, capitalism is the cause of all human woes, deriving legitimacy from the present 
organization of society in such a way that the economic elite’s control of power and resources 
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ensures it has its way. He envisages an uprising of the masses whose revolt will put economic 
and political control into the hands of the masses in preparation for a transition to a stateless 
society. 
 
The diversity of views on human nature should by now be appreciated not only for what they 
assume, but also for the conclusions reached there from. As earlier alluded to, our 
understanding of human nature has far-reaching implications for the process of social 
ordering. Moreover, human nature has a prominent place in the repertoire of explanations and 
justifications embedded in popular consciousness. It is this consciousness that is largely 
responsible for the perceptions people have of their society, and it is these perceptions that 
directly affect their political beliefs and actions (Bell 1986, p.ix).  
 
This paper examines the positions of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes on human nature and 
their implications for social order. This investigation stems from the fact that their 
contractarian views have had, and continue to have, profound influence on political theory 
and practice. Our intention is to bring to the fore the gaps in the two thinkers’ assumptions, 
with the aim of arriving at a synthesis that comes closer to an accurate description of human 
nature and its implications for a well-ordered society than does either of the theories 
separately. 
 
When we talk about contractarian theories, we run the risk of referring to various accounts 
that run parallel to one another. One is aware of the differences between what justice and 
order implies in Hobbes’ political philosophy for instance, in contrast to that of Locke, their 
contractarian approaches notwithstanding. Our use of the word justice here however is not 
with the intention to conflate its meaning with that of social order in spite of their relatedness. 
What we have done is to proceed from the assumption that no society can build an enduring 
social order without justice, no matter how conceived, serving as its basis. It is in 
appreciation of this fact that scholars from the classical period to our day who are concerned 
with how a society should be structured have given the issue of justice a prominent attention 
in their thoughts. One can see this in the works of scholars such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, 
and more recently John Rawls. Central to the issue of justice is the formulation of principles 
by which to govern the basic structure of society (Irele 1993, 12). However, it should be 
borne in mind that no pretence is here made to the effect that the two positions (those of 
Hobbes and Locke)represent a distillation of all contractarian theories. 
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Thomas Hobbes 
In his book, Leviathan (1651), Hobbes describes a hypothetical state of nature preceding the 
execution of the social contract. This state is governed by laws of nature. A law of nature is “ 
a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which 
is destructive to his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same” (Hobbes 1651, 
69). Beginning from a mechanistic understanding of human beings and their passions, 
Hobbes postulates what life would be like without government, a condition which he calls the 
state of nature. In that state, each person would have a right, or license, to everything in the 
world. This inevitably leads to conflict, a "war of all against all", and thus lives that are 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. 
 
Furthermore, within the state of nature, all men are the same in power and ability, such that 
without a sovereign no contract can be made without considerable doubt and suspicion. By 
power here, Hobbes seems to be referring to the power to compel, which carries authority 
with it. Save for the use of might, there is no other way by which a man can compel the other 
to keep his word. This is the difference between justice in the state of nature and justice as 
Hobbes thinks it ought to be. In the state of nature, might is the criterion of order. Hobbes’ 
preference therefore is for people in the state of nature to replace individual might with a 
leviathan that aggregates the might of all and exercises such on their behalf. Thus prudence 
has a vital role to play in Hobbes’ idea of justice since men, even with all their avarice, would 
seek to avoid the punishment that accompanies failure to keep one’s end of the bargain. 
 
Hobbes sees justice as keeping one’s valid covenants and promises. For him, there can be no 
contract if there is reasonable cause for either side to believe the other party will not keep 
their part of the bargain. The other requirement of viable covenants is the presence of a 
sovereign, which oversees the covenants and dispenses punishments if they are not fulfilled. 
Individuals in the society should attend to their own individual affairs, while the sovereign 
power acts to construct the framework of laws and institutions within which they pursue their 
private interests and "to direct their actions to the common benefit" (Hobbes 1651, 227). Thus 
according to Hobbes, the defining feature of a polity is the existence of an effective 
sovereign, that is, a more or less unified, concentrated, and exclusive center of political power 
and authority that stands above the society and governs it through the enactment, 
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enforcement, and administration of laws. This orientation takes for granted the distinction 
between the rulers and the ruled, or the sovereign and subject. 
 
One can understand why Hobbes holds that there can be no justice in the state of nature, for 
he believes that “the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, anger 
and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power” (Hobbes 1651, 71). Without the 
fear of being punished, man’s tendency to renege cannot be tamed. This is because he is by 
nature a self-seeking being. Private appetite is the measurement of good and evil (Lloyd 
2008, 5). Once a valid covenant is made between individuals who do not have reasonable 
cause to believe that the other is plotting against them, there are only two ways to be freed of 
the covenant: either by performance or forgiveness. Nevertheless, the moral shield provided 
by the covenant between the people and their sovereign is not extended to those not included 
in the contract. This includes those from other societies as well as those who cannot 
comprehend the contract such as the senile, imbeciles, infantile and animals. 
 
Hobbes' conception is laced with many implications, one or two of which demand scrutiny. If 
merely keeping one’s covenants can attain a just and orderly state, then justice allows for a 
lot of atrocities: it gives one the leverage to be cruel to outsiders, the naturally challenged, 
and even to animals since they are not part of the contract. In another vein, if Hobbes’ 
conception of human nature is anything to go by, social order is bound to be elusive; for the 
sovereign himself is susceptible to all those traits which warranted the draconian 
arrangement, in addition to wielding unrestricted power. The case cannot be made that 
prudential reasons would guide him, because it is possible in all cases for the sovereign to 
have the means to quell rebellion. Besides, , entering into a contract with the sovereign means 
that one must remain loyal even when the sovereign is pursuing an unjust cause in order to 
avoid sanctions. Going by this logic, those who supported Hitler during the holocaust in 
Europe and those who killed for Sani Abacha in his bid to cling to power in Nigeria were 
merely living up to the terms of the covenants into which they had entered. 
 
All in all, Hobbes’ notion, stemming from his pessimistic view of human nature, is ironically 
excessively permissive even in its narrow conception. Man for sure has got his foibles, but he 
is not a beast that must be tamed at all times. 
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John Locke 
Locke’s theory has a more optimistic view of the state of nature than that of Hobbes. For him, 
human nature is guided by tolerance and reason. The State of Nature is pre-political, but it is 
not pre-moral. Persons are assumed to be equal to one another in such a state, and therefore 
equally capable of discovering and being bound by the Law of Nature. The Law of Nature, 
which is in Locke’s view the basis of all morality, and given to us by God, commands that we 
do no harm to others with regards to their “life, health, liberty, or possessions”. Because we 
all belong equally to God, and because we cannot take away that which is rightfully His, we 
are prohibited from harming one another. Consequently, the State of Nature is a state of 
liberty where persons are free to pursue their own interests and plans, free from interference 
and, because of the Law of Nature and the restrictions that it imposes upon persons, it is 
relatively peaceful (Locke 1821, 182-184). 
 
While the covenant as envisaged by Locke is also governed by reason, it is warranted not to 
curb the chaos that characterized the state of nature as envisaged by Hobbes, but to foreclose 
its possibility. Whereas Hobbes perceives men to be too perverted to keep their word without 
coercion, Locke sees men as being rational and capable of keeping the divine precepts 
guiding the state of nature. To this end, an overbearing sovereign is not needed. In its place is 
a government that is nothing beyond a glorified secretary. Its duty is to guarantee the rights 
that people already enjoy in the state of nature. Why, then, do we need a government if men 
are capable of living by these precepts? Government comes into being when individual men, 
representing their families, come together in the State of Nature and agree to each give up the 
executive power to punish those who transgress the Law of Nature, and hand over such 
powers to a public entity. The duty of that entity is to protect people's liberty. 
 
Thus from Locke’s point of view, we can only talk of social order where there is liberty, 
which covers, among others, the right to life and property. Commenting on Locke’s position, 
Nigel Warburton writes: 
One cannot really talk of liberty in the Lockean sense without the freedom to 
own property. This is because the principal motivation for leaving the state of 
nature is the need for protection of life, liberty and property, and especially the 
last of these. So strong is Locke’s position that he asserts that failure of those 
entrusted with the protection of liberty to do their job should result in their 
overthrow (Warburton 1998, 4).     
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For Locke (1690, 73), it is consent that legitimizes a government. As a consequence, failure 
to act for the common good is an invitation to dissolution. Securing social order through the 
formation of any government invariably requires the direct consent of those who are to be 
governed (Locke 1690, 95). Each and every individual is expected to concur with the original 
agreement to form such a government, but in reality it would be enormously difficult to 
achieve unanimous consent with respect to the particular laws it promulgates. So, in practice, 
Locke supposes that the will expressed by the majority must be accepted as determinative 
over the conduct of each individual citizen who consents to be governed at all. What this 
means is that what is more important than the decision taken is the fact of participation. It 
matters less if a particular decision arrived at say, during an election or referendum, turns out 
not to favour some, inasmuch as the general principle allows for their participation. We may 
all concur that we hold an election, but the majority has the final say as to who wins (Locke 
1690, 97-98). 
 
Although Locke offers several historical examples of such initial agreements to form a 
society, he reasonably maintains that this is beside the point. In other words, even if there 
were no historical references, membership of any society has imposed the necessary burden 
of consent. All people who voluntarily choose to live within a society have implicitly or 
tacitly entered into its formative agreement, and thereby consented to submit themselves and 
their property to its governance (Locke 1690, 119). 
The structure of government so formed from such an agreement is of secondary importance 
to Locke. What matters is that legislative power - the ability to provide for social order and 
the common good by setting standing laws over the acquisition, preservation and transfer of 
property - is provided for in ways to which everyone consents (Locke 1690, 132) . As 
Kemerling (2008) correctly points out, because the laws are established and applied equally 
to all, Locke argues that this is not merely an exercise in the arbitrary use of power, but an 
effort to secure the rights of all more securely than would be possible under the independence 
and equality of the state of nature. 
 
Since standing laws continue in force long after they have been established, Locke asserts 
that the legislative body, responsible for deciding what the laws should be, need only meet 
occasionally, but the executive branch of government, responsible for ensuring that the laws 
are actually obeyed, must be continuous in its operation within the society (Locke 1690, 144). 
In a similar fashion, he supposes that the federative power responsible for representing a 
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particular commonwealth in the world at large needs a lengthy tenure. Locke's presumption is 
that the legislative function of government will be vested in a representative assembly, which 
naturally retains the supreme power over the commonwealth as a whole: whenever it 
assembles, the majority of its members speak jointly for everyone in the society. Thus the 
executive and federative functions are performed by persons (magistrates and ministers) 
whose power to enforce and negotiate is wholly derived from the legislature (Locke 1690, 
153). 
 
However, since the legislature is not perpetually in session, occasions will sometimes arise 
for which the standing laws have made no direct provision, and then the executive will have 
to exercise its prerogative to deal with the situation immediately, relying upon its own 
counsel (Locke 1690, 160). It is the potential abuse of this prerogative, Locke supposed, that 
most often threatens the stability and order of the commonwealth. We can infer that Locke 
envisages a just state founded on liberty, best guaranteed by the separation of state powers - 
powers which in themselves are primarily for the purpose of securing individual liberties and 
property rights. 
 
Social order from the Lockean point of view can be said to obtain when people enjoy their 
right to liberty, to the extent that such enjoyment does not violate the liberty of others. 
However, critics of Locke have argued that his theory is meant to serve the interests of the 
property- owning class by limiting the role of government to the protection of rights and 
property. His emphasis on liberty is taken to such a point that it leaves room for extreme 
inequalities, thereby resulting in class society. Equal right does not amount to equal capacity, 
and this implies that over a period of time some individuals will have more than others. The 
more this happens, the more opportunity they have to lord it over those who are less 
privileged. The tendency to maximize this advantage is what breeds inequality. 
 
Locke also seems to think that his mechanistic notion of authority, in which all arms of 
government are restricted to performing the functions for which they are designed, will 
guarantee the attainment of liberty. Yet what cannot be ruled out is the possible connivance 
of the different arms to undermine those liberties. While there is some merit in the separation 
of powers, it does not automatically foreclose abuse. This probably explains why Locke made 
provision for the removal of any authority that violates the sanctity of its contract with the 
people. 
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The Gaps 
From the comparative analysis above, it is clear that Hobbes and Locke have taken two 
extremely different views of human nature, resulting in contrasting conclusions. Hobbes’ 
obsession with the need for social order accounts for why he prescribed a system which gags 
the individual. On the other hand, Locke was desperate to uphold the sanctity of individual 
liberty, and incorrectly assumed that its protection would translate into an orderly society. 
This position stemmed from Locke’s tendency to see society as no more than a collection of 
individuals, such that an understanding of the part is tantamount to a comprehension of the 
whole. 
 
Hobbes failed to recognize the fact that the idea of a society remains absurd in the absence of 
individuals. It is for this reason that any political arrangement that suppresses claims to 
individuality in the name of the state is bound to experience disorder, as the whole does not 
exist in isolation from the parts. On the other hand, Locke failed to appreciate the fact that 
individuals coming together to form a society do so in order to prevent a degeneration into a 
barbaric state of nature, and that this requires the forfeiture of some of the rights that locke 
ascribed to man in his hypothetical state of nature. 
 
Fundamentally, the two contractarians failed to understand that the human person is a 
combination of both the individual and social dimension. Today this failure lies at the heart of 
the sanctimonious posture of capitalist and socialist assumptions as the two contending 
ideologies in the world. Paradoxically, both have a rational conception of human nature to the 
extent that in its classical form the former, as espoused by Locke and his adherents, advocates 
minimum government in a bid to safeguard the individual’s freedom. The latter similarly 
asserts that the socialist revolution will not be perfected until the state has withered away, so 
that people co-exist without any regulation from a political authority. If this basic conception 
of the human person as a being destined for freedom is shared by both Hobbes and Locke, 
then the question is how they arrived at divergent conclusions. The answer to this is clear: an 
assumption can be interpreted to suit the ideological convenience of whoever is looking at it. 
However, history has shown us that neither positions can, in isolation, sustainably promote 
the much-needed order in any society. 
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On the one hand, unbridled liberty to accumulate wealth as advocated by Locke often leads to 
disasters such as war, recession and monumental drawbacks permeating all facets of life. This 
is more so in this globalised age, since the few who have the means are more likely to acquire 
even more for themselves to the detriment of the majority. It is not by accident therefore that 
such situations are often remedied by welfarist policies, even in societies where it is 
politically incorrect to express sympathy for interventionism. The USA of the 1930s, Europe 
of the Marshall Plan period and the “stimulus packages” during the current economic 
meltdown all provide apt illustrations of this fact. 
 
On the other hand, rigid state regulation as espoused by Hobbes stifles creativity and the 
flourishing of the human spirit, seeking to make robots out of beings who are by nature 
dynamic, so that the system eventually implodes as a result of its internal contradictions. The 
idea of a supreme authority in the mould of Hobbes’ leviathan, akin in a sense to the Platonic 
philosopher-king, is the right ingredient for a dictatorship. By grudgingly and gradually 
liberalising certain areas in which the state used to have absolute grip, especially in the 
economic sphere, China is seeking to avoid a repetition of the implosion experienced by the 
former Soviet Union. Thus like their Western counterparts, Chinese capitalists are becoming 
a common sight in many Third World countries, those in Africa in particular. 
 
While Locke can be correctly seen as epitomizing a lot that characterizes the liberal ideology 
today, this does not imply that Hobbes’ theory in contrast is welfarist in nature. The point 
being made is that Hobbes’ viewpoint shares certain assumptions with some theories, which 
like it favour the subjection of the citizenry to an authority assumed to be best placed to 
manage the society on behalf of its members. This idea is evidently rooted either in a partially 
or totally pessimistic conception of human nature as can be seen in Plato and Hegel 
respectively. 
 
No doubt the human person is a freedom-seeking being. His/her priority is self-preservation. 
Nevertheless, he/she recognises the indispensability of fellow human beings in the attainment 
of his/her aspirations, because there are bound to be cases where his/her interests are 
intertwined with theirs. Concerning this Lucas (1962) has noted: 
The human person is a social creature because of the length of his helpless 
infancy, in which he is dependent on training by his fellow human beings. 
This training depends entirely on the learning processes conducted through 
language, and of necessity requiring stable groups such as the human family or 
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kinship group to enable it to be carried out (Lucas 1962, 129). 
 
The Imperatives of a Social Order 
It is evident that tranquility is a necessary condition for the thriving of all other creative 
initiatives in a bid to foster a society well organized for the overall well-being of its members. 
On the other hand, social disorder is a function of the problem of social control. According to 
Oladipo (1992, 56), social control concerns the issue of the development and maintenance of 
social order within which individuals can exercise their rights, perform their obligations and 
realize their genuine human potentials. Meaningful existence therefore is contingent upon the 
extent to which a society is able to institutionalize frameworks that sustain the maintenance 
of social harmony and prevent the escalation of human conflict. 
 
For Messner (1949, 149), it is the social system as well as a scheme of relations that define 
the political, economic and social roles, rights, duties, entitlements and objections of people 
in a society. In other words, social order has to do with the harmonious balancing of every 
strata of life to the extent that the human person is affected by them all. One should not be 
seen as deserving an overriding attention to the detriment of others. This is due to the fact that 
society thrives better when there is equilibrium in the collective matrix. 
 
Zanden (1997, 153) identifies certain features of social order, without which he considers a 
society to be on the precipice. These include organization, regularity, stability and 
predictability. For him, the attainment of order must be based on an adequate apprehension of 
social roles. By this he means a reciprocal and systematic way of relating obligations and 
rights with expectations. However, it is the view of the present author that apprehension of 
social roles with all its importance may not be adequate for the attainment of  peace and 
order. This is because what is apprehended must also be appreciated.  In other words, not 
only must people understand what their obligations are; they must also value certain things as 
having the capacity to add meaning to their lives. For example, the Africans who worked as 
slaves in foreign plantations understood what their role was, but they also knew it was a role 
into which they were forcefully conditioned. That is why an efficient government, as part of 
the indispensable features of an orderly social arrangement, must strive to put in place 
measures that cater for the well-being of its people. 
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To attempt to reel out a comprehensive list of what it takes to have social order is a herculean 
task. Suffice it to say that efficient systems of justice, political freedom and economic 
empowerment, and internal and external security are some of the things an orderly society 
cannot do without. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have attempted to compare Hobbes’ pessimistic and Locke’s optimistic 
conceptions of human nature and their attendant implications for an enduring social order. In 
exposing the shortcomings of both positions, the paper has explored the possibility of having 
a conception of human nature that is more encompassing than either of them. We are 
persuaded that this approach affords a broader and more realistic way of understanding 
human nature in an effort to entrench social order. It equally serves as a call for caution in the 
absolutisation of ideological values in a way that ignores the dynamism and complexity of the 
human person. 
 
Thus the point emphasised in the foregoing reflections is that most of the individuals’ desires 
and aspirations are not only meaningless, but also unachievable, in the absence of fellow 
human beings who jointly comprise the society. Innately therefore, the human person cannot 
be said to be a beast as Hobbes theory suggests, neither are all human beings virtuous as 
Locke’s implies. This realisation probably accounts for why Locke considered the strong 
possibility of degeneration where there are no checks and balances in government. 
 
The fusion of individual and societal interests should therefore be understood in a way that 
allows for a proper balance that guarantees individual expression and societal cohesion. Too 
much attention on the promotion of societal cohesion may lead to the erosion of individuality, 
just as undue promotion of individual interests may lead to anarchy (Opafola 2008, 10). 
Social dislocation is often the result of unregulated freedom, which leads to skewed 
distribution of resources and privileges in favor of the strong. The promotion of social order 
is therefore germane and deserving of continuous adjustment to ensure the appreciation of 
individual worth and the sustenance of social order. As the current global economic crisis 
suggests, an extremist conception of human nature is bound to lead to social disorder and a 
violent rupture of the tranquility which the individual desires. 
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